Introduction
The literature has demonstrated the bene…ts of international trade for the growth experience of open economies (Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare, 2009 ). Particularly, integration among economies plays an important role in that it increases the long-run rate of growth.
For example, the essential idea of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) is that integration stimulates the worldwide exploitation of increasing returns to scale in research and development.
Factor mobility is also a powerful instrument in the allocation of resources and some regions of the world have fewer barriers to labour mobility than to goods trade. Mundell (1957) , in his formal analysis of the interaction between the international ‡ow of goods and factors, shows that if factors are internationally mobile, in the extreme form, trade in goods will cease, which implies that goods trade and factor ‡ows are substitutes. The important assumptions are those that ensure factor price equalization, including incomplete specialization. However, Hanson (2010) addresses this conjecture and shows cases of complementarity instead. Hence, the way international factors directly in ‡uence the allocation of resources is an empirical question. Taken together these strands of the literature point to the need to construct a comprehensive measure of economic integration among a speci…c group of countries that goes beyond trade statistics and includes both goods and factor ‡ows. This paper develops such a measure and proposes ways to apply it to di¤erent regions of the world.
Let us consider the Middle East, for example. The region comprises a wide and heterogeneous group of countries. Signi…cant variations in per capita incomes, di¤erent current account positions in ‡uenced largely by the possession of natural resources, highly unequal endowments of production factors contribute to this heterogeneity. On the other hand, common religion and common language in most economies introduce a solid common ground. 1 Nowadays, the region shows by far the lowest intra-regional trade level in the world and a low involvement in the world trading system. For these reasons, it is often claimed to be a large underachiever in trade and poorly integrated (World Bank, 2004) .
1 Introduction 3 world? The objective of this paper is to address these issues both formally and empirically.
Several research institutes compile indicators of globalization for countries and the world. Recognizing that the dynamics of globilization is a complex matter, indices give weight to economic, social and political variables (see, for example, the KOF index).
Though useful these indicators assess the extent by which economies are part of the globalized world at a particular moment in time. However, they do not indicate how far these economies are in their integration process because the limits to integration are not speci…ed. Given this, a challenge of this paper is to develop an integration benchmark which consists of a steady state equilibrium characterized by (1) free trade and (2) perfect mobility of both physical and human capital. Metrics are then developed to measure the distance between this benchmark and the observed equilibrium characterized by barriers to international trade and to factor mobility. These metrics allow for comparison of integration over time and across regions.
There is a vast literature that has contributed to our understanding of the various dimensions of international labour migration. For example, recent topics include interest groups and immigration (Facchini et al., 2011) , policy interactions between host and source countries facing skilled-worker migration (Djajić et al., 2012) and temporary low-skilled migration and welfare (Djajić, 2014) . Closer to our work, Borjas (2001) tests the hypothesis of immigration being "the grease on the wheels" of the labour market. Likewise, in our model migration leads to greater labour market e¢ ciency in that the geographic sorting of migrants ensures that the value marginal products of labour are equalized across countries.
Labour migration can also alter the market for physical capital and aggregate production. Galor and Stark (1990) show that the probability of return migration results in migrants saving more than comparable local residents. Kugler and Rapoport (2007) , Javorcik et al. (2011) …nd that the presence of migrants in the US causes US foreign direct investment in the migrants' countries of origin. In contrast, calibrating a dynamic general equilibrium model to match Canadian data over 1861 -1913 Wilson (2003 shows that labour force growth through immigration is responsible for up to three quarters of the rise in the foreign capital in ‡ows. Similarly, the driving force behind international capital ‡ows in our framework is the impact of international labour migration on the value of marginal products of physical capital.
Our analysis focuses on the distribution of output and the stocks of productive factors within a particular region. Particularly, the variables of interest are country output shares of regional output and country factor shares of regional factor supplies which have been shown to be important both theoretically and empirically (see, for example, Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Bowen et al., 1987; Viaene and Zilcha, 2002) . In this paper, shares are assumed to behave randomly and their path to be described by (possibly correlated) re ‡ected geometric Brownian motions with a lower and upper bound. A random process modeled as a Brownian motion is one approach out of many, but it has the property of being parsimonious in terms of number of parameters. A lower bound is justi…ed since nowadays countries are unlikely to disappear; an upper bound matters as the sum of shares must be one. Given this, starting from some initial conditions, we derive the steady state distribution of shares across member countries of a particular region.
Some features of our model have been analyzed before in other frameworks. Particularly, there has been a rapidly growing literature on the empirical measurement of economic integration. Caselli and Feyer (2007) …nd that, despite large di¤erences in capital-labour ratios, marginal products of capital are close across countries. 2 As Lucas (1990) originally pointed out one of the explanations for this outcome is that poor countries also have lower total factor productivity (TFP) and lower endowments of factors complementary to physical capital such as human capital. Other studies, e.g. Riezman et al. (2011) , assess how far the world economy is between autarky and free trade and develop methodologies to answer the question using a global general equilibrium model. Riezman et al. (2013) discuss metrics of globalization for individual economies as distance measures between fully integrated and trade restricted equilibria. Bowen et al. (2011) test empirically the properties of the distribution of outputs and stocks of productive factors expected to arise between members of a fully integrated economic area. 3 An objective of our empirical section is to apply measures of economic integration to three groups of countries. Particularly, we contrast the Middle East with the European Union (speci…cally the 15 original countries or EU-15), which we consider to be a benchmark of "complete" integration, and with Latin America (speci…cally the Latin American Integration Association or ALADI), a control group of countries at about the same stage of economic development. Empirical tests performed by Bowen et al. (2011) show that EU integration rose from the 1960s to equal that of US states by 2000. A comparison to EU integration is also preferred due to limitations on sourcing data for US state physical capital stocks. 4 The other control group, ALADI, is the largest Latin American trading bloc that includes most of the sovereign states of Latin America. Their income per capita is similar to the Middle East (on average if weighted by population) but their degree of integration, suggested by intra-regional trade and memberships in trade agreements, is seemingly higher.
2 Though marginal products of capital (MPK) are generally close, di¤erences are observed across countries of the Middle East. Implied estimates of MPK are 0.09 in Jordan and Morocco, 0.07 in Tunisia, 0.05 in Egypt and 0.03 in Algeria (their Table II , last column).
3 The evolution of integration over time can also be assessed by focussing on prices of homogeneous goods and homogeneous assets assuming that price di¤erentials re ‡ect market frictions and/or lack of arbitrage. For example, Volosovych (2011) looks at patterns of nominal and real long-term bonds; Uebele (2013) analyzes wheat prices in Europe and the USA. 4 Annual estimates of physical capital stocks per states have to be approximated from estimates of the aggregate US physical capital stock in each of nine one-digit industrial sectors that comprise aggregate activity.
Assuming fully integrated goods and factor markets and comparing dynamic equilibrium paths, we obtain the following results: (i ) Using variable elasticity production functions, we obtain an equality between output and factor shares of a given economy.
Particularly, each member's share of an area's total output will equal its share of the area's total stock of physical capital and of human capital; (ii ) We derive the steady state distribution of shares when a lower and an upper bound are imposed on their evolution. This extends Gabaix (1999) result for the expected distribution of city shares of a nation's population; (iii ) Using the properties of this distribution, we derive theoretical shares of each country's output and factors in the grand total. This solution is uniquely determined as a function of the number of countries in the area and of the parameters of the re ‡ected geometric Brownian motion; (iv ) Using the metrics of distance available in the literature, we show that economic integration in the Middle East is incomplete but in 2009 only 2.4% below that of the European Union; (v ) More generally, we …nd that despite large di¤erences in trade patterns, measures of economic integration are remarkably close across regions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 de…nes our geographic units and discusses the respective patterns of trade and factor movements. Section 3 outlines the model and establishes a key theoretical result; in addition, it describes the data and discusses the empirical method used. Section 4 derives the steady state equilibrium distribution of shares and applies Maximum Likelihood on available data. Section 5 includes the derivation of the steady state distribution of shares and the computation of integration measures for each region. Section 6 explores the quantitative implications of our results by computing, for example, how large human capital ‡ows in the Middle East should be in order to achieve complete integration. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains a detailed description of the data sources and methods.
Patterns of Trade and Factor Movements

De…ning Geographic Units
The Middle East is not a uniquely de…ned economic region. Although as a rule religion and geographical borders serve as a guideline for classi…cation, de…nitions range from one study to another and are often adopted to meet study speci…c goals. There are no standards either available in the de…nitions used by di¤erent organizations. Table   1 provides a summary of countries classi…ed as the Middle East and North Africa for the three international organizations that are also the main data sources.Among the four columns we select the de…nition of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as it gives a better data coverage for the purpose of our analysis. The de…nition includes most of the Arab World countries as the World Bank de…nes but augmented by Iran. We exclude This pattern of international migration stocks is also re ‡ected in the countries'balance of payments through remittances from abroad. Remittances paid from the Gulf Sates make the Gulf region one of the most remitting regions in the world (Naufal, 2011) It is a commonly held view that trade is a crucial instrument to achieve greater integration. Regions that demonstrate low trade performance are therefore often classi…ed as poorly integrated. Intra-regional trade in the Middle East in 2009 is 12.4% (see Table   2 ). This is lower than intra-regional trade in the EU (64.9%) and Latin America (18.8%).
Comparative Review of Selected Indicators
Ethnic con ‡icts, protectionism, similar comparative advantages and better product quality outside the region are reasons frequently invoked for this low percentage (see, e.g., Romagnoli and Mengoni, 2009) . Standard trade openness indicators, however, remain considerably high even if fuel exports are excluded (see Table 3 ). 7 This is basically due to high imports in the Middle East that are largely …nanced by high oil revenues. Another indicator of factor mobility is the ratio of nominal GNI to GDP. This ratio in 2009 ‡uctuates between 87.53 for Bahrain and 110.38 for Kuwait. As data suggest almost half of the countries in the Middle East are net receivers of factor income from abroad with a GNI to GDP ratio being above 100. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are also countries receiving high ‡ows of investment income from abroad (see IMF BOPS and World Bank) . GNI exceeds GDP also for a number of labour abundant countries like Jordan and Lebanon. The di¤erence here, however, stems not from investment income but from sizeable income of nationals employed abroad. In contrast, for all countries of Latin America GNI never exceeds GDP meaning that countries are net payers of factor income to the rest of the world: while there is a net in ‡ow of remittances into the region there is a larger net out ‡ow of investment income. This comes at no surprise as production of multinationals is widespread in the region while relatively few local …rms have subsidiaries abroad. 
Equality of Output and Factor Shares
Given this background the analysis of this section focuses on how the distribution of output and stocks of productive factors whould look like if an economic area were characterized by fully integrated goods and factor markets. Particularly, we show the importance of each member's share of an area's total output and its share of the area's total stock of physical capital and of human capital, concepts which have been shown to be important both theoretically and empirically. Particularly, human capital is the factor complementary with physical capital, as it is one of Lucas'major explanations for his puzzle (Lucas, 1990) .
The Economic Framework
We consider an economic area consisting of N countries. Each member is assumed to produce a single homogenous good by means of a constant return to scale, but variable elasticity of substitution (VES) production function, proposed by Revankar (1971) . The function, which is a generalized Cobb-Douglas production function, reads:
where Y nt , K nt , H nt denote output, physical capital and human capital respectively, n = 1; :::; N is a country, t = 1; :::; T a time index. Parameter values satisfy > 0, 0 < < 1, 0 < < 1. The corresponding share of human capital in total output is [1 + (
1)
Knt Hnt ] 1 ; decreasing in and K nt =H nt . The elasticity of substitution depends linearly on the physical-to-human capital ratio:
When = 1 the VES function reduces to the Cobb-Douglas function with a unitary elasticity of substitution ( = 1). We assume > 0 which implies that the humanto-physical capital ratio is such that
. The function spelled out in (1) is therefore di¤erent from the constant elasticity of substitution production function in that the elasticity of substitution implied by the VES production function varies along the isoquant. With > 1, the latter is generally steeper as K nt =H nt increases.
Under these assumptions regarding the technology and assuming free trade and perfect factor mobility within an economic area, an equality between shares arises.
Proposition 1 Given the production function (1), if no barriers to the free movement of goods, physical and human capital exist then
The shares of output, physical and human capital fully equalize for every country n = 1; :::; N: Particularly, each member's share of an area's total output will equal its share of the area's total stock of physical capital and of human capital.
Proof: Marginal products of human capital implied by (1) can be expressed as a function f of human-to-physical capital (x) and as a function g of output-to-physical capital (y). In particular, at any date t:
where
Functions f and g are strictly decreasing. In particular,
as the …rst two terms of the product have opposite signs while the last term is always positive. Namely, > 0 and 1 < 0, which follows directly from the domain over which parameters , , are de…ned, and
which follows from the fact that x > 0 and x > 1 1
. Similarly,
which follows again from the de…nition of the domain of parameters , , .
Perfect mobility of labour brings about the equalization of value marginal products of human capital across member countries as human capital from the low-return country ‡ows to the high-return country until e¢ ciency wages fully equalize. With free trade the price of the single good are similar across countries. Given this and the strict monotonicity of f and g, equality of marginal products implies equality of human-to-physical capital ratios and output-to-capital ratios between any two members of the economic area. Namely, for any pair of countries j and n we obtain the following equality:
13 which is su¢ cient to conclude that for any country n within a fully integrated economic area the human capital share coincides with that of physical capital and the physical capital share coincides with that of output. Speci…cally, employing (3) gives:
from where the equal-share relationship (2) follows.
This proposition is simply the result of …rms' pro…t maximization, the equalization of value marginal products across countries and the properties of equal ratios. 8 It has a number of implications. First, though equal-share relationship (2) has been derived in a frictionless environment, a similar expression obtains in the case of, for example, TFP di¤erences across locations and barriers to international labour mobility. While the former are represented in the model by adding country subscript k to , the latter can be captured by a multiplicative wedge ! k . This wedge is a shorthand for all distortions that potentially a¤ect the marginal return to labour: income tax, migration quota, pension system, etc.
As both parameters enter expressions for value marginal products directly they impact the allocation of primary factors across countries. Repeating the steps of the proof of Proposition 1, we obtain:
Importantly " " represents levels of output and factors that di¤er from (2). Thus, the introduction of TFP di¤er-ences and barriers to free mobility though they rescale variables maintain the equal-share relationship. 9
Second, consider for a moment the relative position of a country within a region by looking at foreign ‡ows of productive factors, mainly human capital, as a contributor to the growth of a selected country. This aspect can be illustrated in our framework by considering immigration, an exogenous in ‡ow H > 0 of human capital into the nth economic unit that originates from outside the region. 10 An in ‡ow of human capital from 8 Capital mobility is redundant to establish the result. With the …nal good being freely traded a single commodity price will prevail among member countries. With labour being the mobile factor of production, we expect it to ‡ow from the low-wage to the high-wage economy until its marginal product is equalized across countries. With similar goods prices and equal wages, the returns to physical capital must equal among countries as long as production technologies are similar. 9 The last equality of relationship (4) requires, however, one of the following two conditions to hold: either = 1 or k = n in any bilateral comparison of marginal products of human capital. 1 0 In contrast, an in ‡ow of migrants from inside the region is endogenous. It responds to cross-country outside the integrated area (for example, from India) will, at impact, a¤ect relationship (2) for the nth country as follows:
H kt + H Thus, migration into country n increases its share of the total stock of human capital.
Since the increase in the stock of human capital raises the marginal return to physical capital in country n, incentives arise to increase investment in physical capital. Given the increase in both stocks of productive factors, country n's output and share of total area output increase. These adjustments in output and factor stocks continue until the equality of shares in (2) is restored, but now with country n achieving a relatively higher level of economic activity than originally.
Having established the equality of output and factor shares in integrated areas, we now verify its empirical validity. To that end we outline the construction of our data set and then perform empirical tests.
Data Sources and Methods
Let us denote a share of a variable j 2 fY; K; Hg by S jnt : Thus, to compute output shares S Y nt we use: prices. Human capital is measured as total population aged 15 and over that has at least completed secondary education. The data is obtained from Barro and Lee's data set on educational attainment. Because the data is only available on a …ve-year interval basis and because it exhibits a clear exponential growth we use cubic splines to interpolate missing observations. The data on human capital for Lebanon and Oman is estimated using information on population with secondary and tertiary schooling obtained from their national statistical o¢ ces. A more detailed description of the data and the methods employed for interpolation and extrapolation is contained in the Appendix.
For the purpose of our empirical analysis we further compute the shares of output, physical and human capital separately for the countries of the Middle East. 
Tests of Proposition 1
To test whether there is conformity between the ranks of the output and factor shares we compute Spearman rank correlation coe¢ cients at every time point and compare them across regions and over time. Contrary to Pearson correlation, rank correlation not only allows for non linearities to be present in a relationship, but also considerably lowers the in ‡uence of large observations that are typical to our data. Though Proposition 1 established the equality of shares, its underlying assumptions can be used to explain why deviations from equality might be observed in empirics. First, part of the equality of shares in (2) breaks down when the parameter space includes = 0.
With = 0 the VES function degenerates to the …xed-coe¢ cient function as a special case: Y nt = K nt . This speci…cation implies redundancy of human capital in the nth economy as the employment of human capital is lower than its endowment H nt . In this case, the human capital share in (2) no longer equals the other two. Second, in some other economies, human capital might be instead the constraining factor. It is a simple matter to obtain this outcome by interchanging the role of K nt and H nt in (2). In this case, the physical capital share in (2) no longer equals the other two. Lastly, the human capital share in (4) di¤ers from the other two when, as shown in footnote 9, the assumptions = 1 or k = n are not veri…ed in any bilateral comparison of marginal products of labour.
Steady State Equilibrium Distribution of Shares
Dynamics of Shares
We assume that changes in shares can be the realization of some particular states of nature.
There are numerous reasons why shares could be random. Innovation and discoveries of natural resources are usually believed to follow a random process once investments in those activities have been made. Also, upheavals, military con ‡icts and natural disasters hit output, stocks of human and physical capital at random. To characterize such randomness we assume that both output and factor shares evolve according to a re ‡ected geometric Brownian motion (RGBM) with a drift parameter , volatility , lower bound b = min S jnt and upper bound d = max S jnt . That is, we assume:
where B t is a Wiener process, while L t and U t denote non-negative, non-decreasing, rightcontinuous processes, guaranteeing re ‡ections every time S jnt goes below the lower or above the upper bound (Harrison, 1985) . We further impose a normalization constraint at every time point to ensure share summation to one:
S jnt = 1; t = 1; :::; T:
The evolution of shares spelled out in (5) recognizes a link between output and primary factors in that the process from which shocks to the shares are derived is common to all.
Though the process is similar, the realization of the states of nature might di¤er across shares. For example, strikes, technical breakdowns and political upheavals disrupt the production of goods with minor impacts on the stocks of production factors. Later in this section, however, we discuss the case of explicitly modelled correlations. Given this we show:
Proposition 2 If shares evolve according to a re ‡ected Brownian motion given by (5) and its drift and volatility parameters satisfy < 2 2 , there exists a steady state cumulative distribution of these shares that has the following form:
Particularly, it is a Pareto distribution with the tail index equalling 1
Proof: Itô lemma applied to log S jnt yields the following expression for (5) for any initial value S jn0 :
A convenient way to model re ‡ections is to use Skorokhod maps that restrict shares to take values within a given interval. In particular, L t and U t are de…ned as ( L t = inf 0 s t (fX ns log bg^f0g)
where inf stands for the in…mum of a set so that re ‡ections occur now at log b and log d.
For and such that < 
:
The corresponding cumulative distribution is then given by (7).
It is clear from (7) that though realizations of states of nature di¤er distributions of output and factor shares are similar when = 0.
An important extension of the proposition is that the steady state distribution remains
Pareto even when shares of country i and country j and/or output and factor shares are correlated. The shares must follow a certain pattern of correlations described by the so called skew symmetry condition: R diag + diag R | = 2 , where is a correlation matrix, diag is a diagonal matrix whose entries are the variances of each single component of a multivariate RGBM and R is a re ‡ection matrix that corrects correlations when one of the single components hits the barrier (see Harrison and Williams, 1987; Dai and Harrison, 1992) .
1 1 Note that the tail index can take any positive value. The adding-up constraint (6) that we impose further will prevent shares from being in…nite in expectation in case of tail index smaller than 1. Given Proposition 2 we are able to focus on the steady state analysis of shares S nj and therefore omit the time index t. We rank shares in a descending order attributing the highest rank to the country having the largest share of variable of interest within the area.
Then a country ranked the nth has the nth largest share within the area or, equivalently, n countries have their shares larger or equal to the nth largest share. This allows to deduce the following relationship between the cumulative distribution function and a rank:
Using the cumulative distribution function of shares (7) we obtain:
where = 1 2 2 . Using expressions (4.1) and (9) we obtain a non-linear relationship between a rank and a share: 
Empirical Results
Having described the properties of our fully integrated group of economies through Propositions 1 to 2 we now estimate the long-term relationship derived from the steady state distribution of shares and show ways to apply Maximum Likelihood on available data to estimate and .
Power Law
Equation (10) is a long-run relationship derived from the steady state distribution of shares, a so called power law. The distribution of ranks S jn is said to follow a power law when, for su¢ ciently large values of the n-th ranked variable S jn , its size is inversely proportional to a power of its rank. Taking the natural logarithm of (10) yields:
log R jn = log log S jn ; j 2 fY; K; Hg:
To test whether the power law holds in our sample and whether the exponent of the power law is close to unity we run simple OLS regressions on a cross-section at every time point using the log speci…cation above. To correct for a possible small sample bias we follow Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011) and use adjusted ranks:
log (R jn 1=2) = log log S jn ; j 2 fY; K; Hg: (11) Figure 5 shows the estimated slopes of regression (11) for the three sets of shares in the three regions under consideration. Estimated exponents are all signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 5% signi…cance level.
The data therefore can be indeed well described by power laws. The estimates, however, are all signi…cantly di¤erent from one, which indicates that there are signi…cant deviations of the share distributions from Zipf's law. A slight decreasing trend, however, can be observed for most of the exponents, which is a sign that, although slowly, convergence to Zipf's law may be taking place.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation of RGBM Parameters
The second part of our empirical analysis uses historical series to estimate the parameters of the re ‡ected geometric Brownian motion. We follow the estimation approach outlined in Aït-Sahalia (2002) and apply Maximum Likelihood (ML) on available data for output and factor shares to estimate the parameters and . Let = ( ; ) 0 denote a vector of RGBM parameters. A critical step is the derivation of the conditional density function of normalized RGBM. No such density in its analytical form exists in the literature. To obtain approximate estimates we use the density of RGBM with a sole lower barrier derived in Veestraeten (2008) . In this case the density reads: S jnt denotes as before country's n share of variable j at time point t and is a time step equalling 1 for annual data. ML therefore solves:
with the log-likelihood function`being:
ln[P (S jnt jS jn;t ; )]:
Solution to (12) can be obtained by various numerical optimization algorithms such as, for example, the algorithm of Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS).
Estimation results of model parameters and for each set of shares are presented in Table 5 . 12 From the table it is clear that the volatility of output shares is the largest. This is partly due to the fact that output is a ‡ow variable and is therefore more volatile than the more steady stocks of physical and human capital. In addition, output volatility in the Middle East is high though expected since MENA countries have experienced numerous armed con ‡icts that signi…cantly a¤ected its output. That volatility in EU is so low can be explained by policy coordination that is a key to the region. For example, consider the scenario where all N countries in the integrated area put in place a coordinated policy such that the human capital of each member country increases by a factor ( > 1).
Then, using (2):
In this situation shares are not modi…ed and the relative position of each country in the 1 2 We tested this estimation procedure on numerous simulated RGBMs with di¤erent and to see how estimation using normalized data a¤ects parameter estimates. The method delivers estimates that are consistent with true parameter values when simulated data is non-normalized. When simulated RGBM data is normalized and then used as input for estimation, the method still delivers volatility (but not drift) estimate close to its true value. total remains unchanged. It is clear from the above equation that complete harmonization of policies, expressed in growth factors, makes these shares deterministic and does not modify the distribution of shares of member countries. Hence, if one abstracts from random shocks then the volatility of shares would be zero according to this result. This is a useful benchmark for our empirical analysis.
Assessing the Degree of Economic Integration
Theoretical Shares
Assume further without loss of generality that country 1 has the largest and country N has the smallest share of variable j in the area. That is, assume the following:
S j1 S j2 ::: S jN ; j 2 fY; K; Hg:
Given the above information, we derive the shares that describe the steady state equilibrium of an integrated area:
Proposition 3 The steady state distribution of shares is uniquely determined by the drift parameter , volatility and the number of countries N: Particularly, shares are the solution to the following set of equations
and
Proof. Using (10) and taking the ratio of the …rst share over the second share, the …rst share over the third, etc. gives the sequence of ratios in the proposition. The de…nition of shares implies also that the same rule holds not only for the shares, but also for the levels of the variables j 2 fY; K; Hg :
This in turn together with the de…nition of shares uniquely determines the share of the …rst ranked country or the largest share as a function of the number of countries only.
Namely:
Shares of remaining countries can be uniquely determined using (13).
Proposition 3 gives rise to a number of observations. First, assuming = 0 13 implies = 1 and Zipf's law: the share of the …rst ranked country is twice as large as the share of the second ranked country, three times as large as the share of the third country and so on. Also, more importantly, Proposition 3 enables a direct computation of shares for any region under investigation. 14 Table 6 applies the proposition to the Middle East and gives the complete distribution of shares for the region. Likewise Table 6 includes the theoretical distribution of shares for our two control groups, namely the EU-15 (N = 15) and the Latin American Integration Association (N = 14). It is worth noting that as long as the drift parameter is zero the steady state distribution is not a¤ected by volatility.
This allows for heterogeneity of volatility parameters across variables and across countries.
We denote the steady state distribution as S.
1 3 = 0 follows from the adding-up constraint (6). Let gjnt = S jnt S jn;t 1 1 denote the growth rate of factor j, country n at time point t. Then (6) implies P N n=1 Sjn;t 1gjnt = 0. Taking average of this expression over time gives Et P N n=1 Sjn;t 1gjnt = P N n=1 Sjn;t 1Etgjnt = 0 and because in our model the drift parameter does not vary across countries, this holds only if Etgjnt = 0. Therefore, the average growth rate must be zero.
1 4 An implicit property of the concept of shares is share summation to one given by (6). This constraint in combination with the result of Proposition 3 can be used to express the barriers of the RGBM in terms of its drift and volatility parameters. This is useful in identifying the model parameters when estimating the model and running numerical simulations. To that end, we use the expression of the …rst share as implied by (10) and set it equal to the …rst share found in (14) 
Measurement of Integration
Given the theory and the empirical analysis of the preceding sections we now assess and interpret the gap between the limiting distribution of Table 6 and the observed outcomes characterized by the data.
We measure the degree of economic integration by an integration index I E ( S; S t ) which is a transformed Euclidean distance. It is de…ned as
where E( S; S t ) is the Euclidean distance, measuring the deviation of observed shares S jnt from their theoretical counterparts S jn found by applying Proposition 3:
The Euclidean metric is always non-negative and takes the value zero when for each variable j and for each n ranked country, S jnt = S jn : this is the property that arises under full integration. The lower is the degree of economic integration the greater is the deviation of the measure from zero, the lower is the value of I E ( S; S t ). 15 Due to share summation to one in (6) there exists a strictly positive lower bound of the measure. We estimate this value to be equal to 0:55. This estimate is the minimum value of (15) obtained by taking 10000 bootstrap samples with replications from the data on an extended set regions. 16
1 5 To test robustness of our …ndings to di¤erent measures of distance between observed and theoretical shares we also compute the Theil entropy index.
The index is given by T ( S; St) = 1 3
and respectively the integration measure IT ( S; St) = e T ( S;S t ) : Like Euclidean integration index the Theil index takes the maximum value of unity when observed shares coincide with their theoretical counterparts and there exists a positive minimum value due to share summation to one. The results using this index lead to the same conclusions as the results of integration index IE. 1 6 The regions we considered were the Middle East, the Pan-Arab Arab Free Trade Area, Latin American Integration Association, EU-15, Gulf Cooperation Council, Mercosur, Andean Community and EU-12
The integration index therefore takes values within the (0:55; 1] interval, with 1 arising under full integration. 17 Computation of I E ( S; S t ) makes use of the following information. Theoretical shares are found in Table 6 while observed shares are ranked in the descending order so that rank 1 (n = 1) is attributed to the country with the largest share in the area; rank 2 (n = 2) to the second largest share; etc. Figure 6 displays the computed index values. (EU-15 excluding non euro countries). 1 7 Our results are also robust with respect to the transformation we choose to apply to Euclidean distance. In particular, applying the linear transformation IT ( S; St) = 1 E( S; St) does not change the results. This is due to highly concentrated values that the Euclidean measure takes. Given those values both linear and exponential transformations produce almost identical results.
1 8 Slope estimate of the integration index regression on time is signi…cant at the 5% level for the period 1980 -2009. 1 9 We note, however, that our data is non sampled so that the sampling error is zero and our computed integration index is a true population value for which no con…dence intervals exist. Statistical signi…cance in this case accounts rather for possible data measurement errors. 
EU−15
Index 5−95%
Note: Shaded area denotes a 95% con…dence interval obtained by taking 10000 bootstrap samples with replications.
Regional Comparisons
The computation of the integration index also reveals considerable regional di¤erences. 1.00PAFTA GCC MENA Mercosur Andean
Re-computed Integration Measures
Our results so far indicate that economic integration in the Middle East is seemingly comparable to that of EU-15 in 2009. Is it due to economic factors or to any distortion in our measurement? These questions raise the issue of robustness of our results. To that end we use the results on the conformity of ranks implied by Proposition 1 and then re-compute our indices.
Spearman rank correlations in Section 3.3 indicate that the conformity of ranks is not perfect, i.e. the equal-share relationship, that should hold in our fully integrated benchmark, does not always hold in the data. We did not take this into account while computing the deviations from the fully integrated benchmark in our index (16). We essentially missed to assure that the country that ranks the nth in the observed distribution of shares is the same across all types of shares. There are three ways to re-compute index This is because conformity of ranks is higher in EU-15 and therefore the equal-share relationship is met closer. Nevertheless, the corrected index value for MENA in 2009 is only 2.35 percent lower than that of EU-15 implying that the extent of integration in the Middle East is e¤ectively larger than commonly believed.
Counterfactuals
The analysis in Klein and Ventura (2009) Table 6 . Our numerical results are reproduced in column (2) of Table 7 and are compared to actual stocks in column (3).
Results of Table 7 suggest that for a large number of countries in the Middle East a signi…cant increase in human capital is needed to achieve the level compatible with full integration: the percentage change in column (3) is positive for the majority of coun-2 4 The output based computation suggests an abrupt drop in the the degree of integration in EU-15 after 2001. A look at the data reveals that an abrupt decline in the measure occurs because the two large EU-15 economies, UK and France, interchange their positions in output share ranking. The output share of UK increased from 16.00% in 2000 to 16.06% in 2001 and turned out to be higher than 16.05%, the 2001 output share of France. This must have had a signi…cant impact on the index as now the observed UK shares were compared to the second largest theoretical share. Particularly large deviations would become for observed human capital shares, in which the UK appears to be the …fth ranked country (see also Figure 3 ). Further inspection of the human capital data in Barro and Lee (2013) reveals that the number of adults with at least completed secondary education is unusually low in the UK (see the Appendix). Because of possible data inaccuracy we do not interpret this drop as an actual drop in the extent of integration and conclude that the degree of integration has been persistently higher in EU-15. 
Concluding Remarks
The paper developed a framework that enables the measurement of the degree of economic integration among a group of countries. The objective was to construct an integration benchmark that consists of a steady state equilibrium characterized by free trade and perfect factor mobility. Metrics were then used to measure the distance between the benchmark and the data.
Measurement allowed for a comparison of integration indices over time and across regions. It was performed on the European Union, Latin Amerca and the Middle East, the latter being characterized by low intra-regional trade and limited involvement in the global system. We have shown that degrees of integration in 2009 were very close, that of the Middle East being just 2.4% lower than in EU-15, a benchmark of "complete" integration.
It is a commonly held view that trade is the instrument of choice to achieve greater
integration. Regions that demonstrate low intra-regional trade are often concluded to be poorly integrated. The paper casts doubt on the assertion that trade is necessary in order to achieve a high level of economic integration among a group of countries. What we have shown is that international labour and capital mobility can be powerful instruments to achieve integration even in the absence of such trade and of institutional arrangements like free trade agreements and WTO membership. Regarding EU-15 an element of concern in our research is the fact that the percentage of adults with at least completed secondary education is unrealistically low in the UK (see panel (c) in Figure A. 2). This may explain a large drop in our integration measure when output based computation for EU-15 is performed. Second, no data was available for Lebanon, Libya and Yemen.
Physical Capital
The …rst above mentioned problem was solved as follows. We computed the total investment I it in constant 2000 prices at time period t for country i using the real investmentto-GDP ratios available in PWT 6.2. Furthermore, from the inventory rule
we computed depreciation rates it and by applying a 5-year moving average we extended the rates until 2009 (see Figure A. 3). To estimate unavailable capital data for Lebanon, Libya and Yemen we employed real investment-to-GDP ratios available in Penn World Tables, version 7 (PWT 7.0). We computed total investment in constant 2000 prices and we extended the series backwards using for Libya the growth rates of gross capital formation in constant prices taken from IMF IFS database and for Yemen using real investment taken from PWT 5.6. As a result total real investment for the whole period 1970-2009 was obtained. Given total real investment initial real capital stock K i0 and depreciation rates it are su¢ cient to compute the whole series of capital using the inventory rule. For Lebanon and Yemen it was estimated as the average depreciation rate of Syria and Jordan and for Libya the average depreciation rate of Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt was taken. Initial capital stock was then estimated as
where t = 0 is the earliest year for which real capital-to-GDP of partner countries is available, n i is the number of partner countries for the country in question and Y i0 is a real output of country i at the initial time period. As in case of it estimation, Syria and Jordan were taken as partner countries for Lebanon and Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt were taken as partner countries for Libya.
Output
Output in all country groupings, measured by real GDP, is obtained from PWT 7.0. 
